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Abstract 
Given a formula of the propositional p-calculus, we construct a tableau of the formula and 
define an infinite game of two players of which one wants to show that the formula is satisfiable, 
and the other seeks the opposite. The strategy for the first player can be further transformed into 
a model of the formula while the strategy for the second forms what we call a refutation of the 
formula. Using Martin’s Determinacy Theorem, we prove that any formula has either a model 
or a refutation. This completeness result is a starting point for the completeness theorem for the 
p-calculus to be presented elsewhere. However, we argue that refutations have some advantages 
of their own. They are generated by a natural system of sound logical rules and can be presented 
as regular trees of the size exponential in the size of a refuted formula. This last aspect completes 
the small model theorem for the p-calculus established by Emerson and Jutla (1988). Thus, on a 
more practical side, refutations can be used as small objects testifying incorrectness of a program 
specification expressed by a p-formula, we illustrate this point by an example. 
1. Introduction 
It is now common to view computer programs as state transformers, that is, actions 
that can change one state of computer hardware to another. The notion of change 
is intrinsic in modal logic which admits a hypothesis that the world may change; 
rather than a single unique world, one considers there multiple possible worlds and 
relations between them, as, for example, the states of an environment evolving in 
time. This aspect makes the modal logic a valuable tool for reasoning about program 
behavior. 
A variety of logical formalisms have been proposed in this context, including Hoare 
logic, Dijkstra’s weakest precondition calculus, dynamic logic, temporal ogic and 
automata-based formalisms. A uniform mathematical framework subsuming all of these 
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and more is provided by the p-calculus, a formalism permitting characterization of cor- 
rectness properties as extremal fixed points of predicate transformers [ 13,2,8]. 
In spite of its great expressive power, a propositional version of the p-calculus [8] 
was proven decidable in deterministic single exponential time [3], which makes this 
logic interesting for applications to verification of real life systems. 
Although the p-calculus, and especially the propositional p-calculus attracted much 
interest [8,17, 1,5] the attempts to iind a complete finitary axiomatization for the cal- 
culus systematically failed. Even for strictly weaker modal logics such as PDLA no 
finitary complete axiom system has been known. 
A complete axiomatization of any calculus is still interesting even when it is de- 
cidable. The main gain is that a complete axiomatization gives us deeper insight into 
the calculus. On a more practical side, we can think of a prover instead of a model 
checker for verifying properties. An advantage of a prover could be that it would allow 
an interaction between computer and user, in which a user might give some hints, for 
example, an auxiliary formula for an application of a cut rule. This would help the 
computer in what is essentially an exponential task. 
The present paper constitutes the first part of the work, the final goal of which is 
to prove a completeness theorem for the p-calculus. The second part which gives an 
actual system and proves its completeness is due to the second author [20, 191 and will 
be presented at length elsewhere. 
In the present paper, we introduce a concept of refutation which can be viewed as 
some approximation of (or substitute for) the concept of proof. Refutations are trees 
generated by some natural system of tableau rules which are sound logical rules, but, 
unlike proofs, refutations may have infinite branches. We show that any formula of the 
propositional p-calculus has either a model or a refutation. This result is an advance 
toward the completeness theorem for the p-calculus to be proved in the second part of 
the work (for a preliminary version, see [20]) . Indeed, the proof system proposed there 
is designed in such a way that a proof of a valid ,n-formula cp can be obtained from 
a refutation of ~cp. Thus the completeness theorem follows from the above mentioned 
completeness result for refutations. 
We believe, however, that the concept of refutation and the relevant result are of 
some interest of their own, and this is at least for two reasons. 
First, refutations turn out to be small objects: using results from automata theory, we 
show that a refutation of a p-calculus formula can be always made a regular tree of 
the size exponential in the size of the formula. This result completes the small model 
theorem for the ,u-calculus due to Emerson and Jutla [3]. Combining the two results, 
we can state the following: 
A formula of the propositional p-calculus has either a model or a refutation, any of 
which may be chosen to be a regular tree which can be presented as a graph of 
exponential size, produced in exponential time. 
This suggests that refutations may play some role in program verification as small 
objects that witness the validity of p-formulas; we illustrate this point by some exam- 
ples. In this context, it would be interesting to estimate the length of “real” proofs in 
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the existing proof systems, as the system for the p-calculus given in [20], or a system 
for much weaker logic PDL [9]. The question seems to be difficult, but we know that 
the length of proofs in any reasonable proof system must be at least exponential and 
we are tempted to conjecture that it is much bigger than that. 
The second aspect of refutations which is, we believe, of some theoretical interest is 
the connection with determinacy of certain infinite games. In our paper, we consider 
an infinite game that is played on a tableau of a p-calculus formula. Roughly speaking, 
one of the players wants to show that the formula is satisfiable, and the other seeks 
the opposite. The game is determined by Martin’s determinacy theorem [lo]. Now it 
turns out that a winning strategy (if it exists) for the first player induces a model of 
the formula, while a strategy for his/her opponent can be identified with a refutation. 
Infinite games were studied in set theory [lo, 111, they also appear in automata 
theory in several different proofs that have been proposed for Rabin’s Complementation 
Lemma [7,12,5]. The present paper exhibits yet another aspect of such games which 
is an intriguing link between determinacy (“one of the player has a winning strategy”) 
and completeness (“a formula has a model or a refutation”). 
The paper is organized as follows. After a preliminary Section 2, we introduce, in 
Section 3, a system of rules for generating tableaux of the p-calculus formulas. We 
present also two subsystems that can generate what we call refutations and pre-models, 
respectively. The concept of a game is introduced in Section 4, where we also use 
the Martin’s Theorem to show that any p-calculus formula has either a refutation or a 
pre-model. In Section 5, we show that a pre-model can indeed be transformed into a 
model and vice versa. In Section 6, we consider the complexity of the constructions in 
consideration. In the Appendix A, we illustrate by a simple example, how our concept 
of refutation can be helpful in the analysis of specifications, 
2. Syntax and semantics 
Let Prop = {p,q,. . .} be a set of propositional letters, Var = {X, Y,. . .} a set of 
variables and Act = {a, b,. . .} a set of actions. Formulas of the p-calculus over these 
three sets can be defined by the following grammar: 
F := Var 1 Prop 1 -Prop 1 F VF 1 F AF 1 (Act)F 1 [ActIF ( pLar.F 1vVar.F 
Observe that we allow negations to occur only before propositional letters. The 
negation of a formula is defined inductively by DeMorgan laws and the equivalences 
+a]a G (a)-xx and Y&U(X) = vX.X(-X). Syrnbolfsis an abbreviation of a formula 
p A up for some propositional constant p. We will sometimes use crX.a(X) to denote 
&&x(X) or v&x(X). Formulas are interpreted in Kripke models of the form J%! = 
(S&P), where 
0 S is a nonempty set of states, 
l R is a function assigning a binary relation R(a) on S to each action a in Act. 
l p is a function assigning a set of states to each propositional letter in Prop. 
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For a given model Jt? and an assignment Val: Var -+ B(S), the set of states in 
which a formula a is true, I] CI I]$ is defined inductively as follows (we will omit 
superscript _M when it causes no ambiguity): 
II 1 lIval = ~4W 
II P IIVa[ = P(P) 
II ‘P II TG/ = s - P(P) 
IICIA~IIVa~~IIaIIValnI/PIIV~~ 
II u v B II Val = II a II Val u II P II va, 
II (4x II val = {s: 3s’.(s,s’) E R(a) As’ E II a II val) 
II Iala II Vo[ = G 1 ~~‘.W’) E R(a) 3 s’ E II 01 II Vd 
II PJWW IIVal = f--p’ cs: II fx lIvar[s~,x] c 0 
II vx.4m IIVQl = UP’ cs : s’ c II x Ilvar[s~,x]~ 
We will also write k’,s, Val + c1 to mean that s E (( o! I]$. Formula q will be called 
valid, in symbols b cp, iff it is true in every state of every model. 
Definition 2.1. A variable X in oX.a(X) is guarded iff every occurrence of X in a(X) 
is in scope of some modality operator ( ) or [ 1. We say that a formula is guarded iff 
every bound variable in the formula is guarded. 
Lemma 2.2 (Kozen). Every formula is equivalent to some guarded formula. 
Proof. Let cp be a formula, we show how to obtain an equivalent guarded formula. 
Suppose ‘p = @.tx(X) and a(X) is a guarded formula. Suppose X is unguarded 
in some subformula of e(X) of the form aY$(Y,X) and Y is guarded in oYJ?( KX). 
Then one can use the equivalence oY$(Y,X) E fi(gY$(Y,X),X) to obtain a formula 
with all unguarded occurrences of X outside the fixpoint operator. This way we obtain 
a formula equivalent to a(X) but with all unguarded occurrences of X not in the scope 
of a fixpoint operator. 
Now using the laws of classical propositional logic we can transform this formula 
to conjunctive normal form (considering formulas of the form (a)y and [a]y as propo- 
sitional constants). This way we obtain a formula 
(X v ccl(X)) A . . . A (X v cc&Y)) A P(X) (1) 
where all occurrences of X in ~(1 (X), . . . , ai( p(X) are guarded. Observe that it may 
happen that some of ai(X) may be just false and p(X) may be true. 
Variable X occurs only positively in (1) because it did so in our original formula. 
Formula (1) is equivalent to 
(x V (@l(X) A.. . A Q(X))) A p(x) 
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We will show that pX.(XVE(X))AP(X) is equivalent to &KE(X)A/?(X). It is obvious 
that 
t= (F=(X) A B(X)) =+ (@(X v i(X)) A P(X)) 
Let y(X) and y(X) stand for t?(X) A /I(X) and (X V E(X)) A /?(X) respectively. To 
prove the other implication it is enough to observe that + jQX.y(X)) + @y(x) as 
the following calculation shows: 
Henceforth we will consider only guarded formulas. This restriction is not necessary 
but simplifies some of the definitions to follow (see Remark 3.7). 
3. Tableaux 
In this section we present a system of rules for constructing a tableau for a formula. 
Tableaux will serve as arenas for a game we will consider later. We also define two 
kinds of substructures of tableaux: quasi-model and quasi-refutation. It is convenient to 
introduce the concept of a definition list [16] which will name the fixpoint subformulas 
of a given formula in order of their nesting. We will employ the technique of reusing 
definition constants as described in [15]. 
We extend vocabulary of the p-calculus by a countable set Dcons of fresh symbols 
that will be referred to as dejinition constants and usually denoted U, V,. . . These new 
symbols are now allowed to appear positively in formulas, like propositional variables. 
A dejnition list is a finite sequence of equations : 
63 = (U, = aJ.cq(X)), . . . ,(U, = aJ.a,(X)) 
where Ui,..., U,, E DCons and aiXai(X) is a formula such that all definition con- 
stants appearing in cli are among UI, . . . , Vi-l. We call Ui a p-constant or a v-constant 
according to Oi = p or c< = V. We assume that Ui # Uj and ai # aj, for i # j. If i < j 
then Ui is said to be older than Uj (Uj younger then Ui) with respect to the definition 
list 9. 
Given a formula ~1, we construct a definition list for CI by means of the contraction 
operation 0~0 defined recursively as follows: 
1. Dp(l=D-p(l=DX(l=DU~=0; 
2. DkHl = D[aldJ = lb@ 
3. Dct A /30 = Dct V /?a = Dcl(J o D/?a, operation o is defined below; 
4. D@.a(X)(/ = ((U = pX.a(X)),@(U)Q) where U is new; 
5. DvX.U(X)(J = ((U = vX.a(X)), om(U)~) where U is new. 
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The operation Da00 D/I(J is defined as follows. First, we make sure that the definition 
constants used in DuQ are disjoint from those used in Dba. Then if it happens that 
(u = r) E Ddl and (J’ = r> E D/Q, we delete the definition from the list D/?Q and 
replace V with U in Dfi(J. This may cause other formulas to be doubly defined and 
we deal with them in the same way. 
For a formula a and a definition list 9 containing all definition constants occurring 
in a we define the expansion operation QclJg, which subsequently replaces definition 
constants appearing in the formula by the right hand sides of the defining equations, 
duo3 = ~[~,lGJ~ * * [~ll~ll, where 9 = (UI = cl,),...,(U, = cr,) 
A tableau sequent is a pair (r, 9), where r is a finite set of formulas and 9 is a 
definition list that includes all the definition constants occurring in r. 
A tableau axiom is a sequent r t9 such that some formula and its negation occur 
in r. 
We extend expansion operations to tableau sequents in a natural way: 
In what follows we will often drop the prefix “tableau” if it is clear from the context. 
Below we present the set of rules for constructing tableaux. These rules can be 
considered as logical rules when read upside-down. We write them with premises 
below the line because it is more appropriate for tableaux construction; we prefer to 
view a tableau as a tree expanding downwards. This style also puts emphasis on the 
fact that this rules are used to construct tableaux rather than proofs. 
Definition 3.1. Let Y be the following set of tableau rules : 
(and) 
(or) 
Cons) 
(PI 
(VI 
(am( )) 
u,r kg 
a(U), r kg 
whenever (U = aXa( E 23 
iux.c0 r b 
_- -0 whenever (U = pX.a(X)) E 9 
a.~r(x), r kg 
u,r h 
whenever (U = 
r k3 
vx.a(X)) E 9 
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where in the last rule each formula in r is a propositional constant, a variable, a 
negation of one of them or a formula of the form (b)j3 or [b]/I for some action b and 
a formula /I (in other words, no other rule is applicable to r k,, ). 
Observe that each rule, except (or) and (a/Z( )), has exactly one premise. The rule 
(or) has two premises and the number of premises in the rule (au{ )) is equal to the 
number of formulas of the form (~)a in r and may be 0. 
The system Ymod is obtained from Y by replacing the rule (or) by two rules (ore) 
and (ortiphr) defined in the obvious way. 
The system Yref is obtained from 9’ by replacing the rule (alZ( )) by the rule 
with the same restrictions on formulas in r as in the case of (uZl( )) rule. 
Remarks 3.2. If we consider a sequent r FB as a formula A Qrj 9 + fs then the rules 
of the system YPrer become sound logical rules written upside-down. 
Definition 3.3. Given a positive guarded formula y, a tableau for y is any labeled tree 
(K,L), where K is a tree and L a labeling function, such that 
1. the root of K is labeled with y h where 9 = D y(J, 
2. if L(n) is a tableau axiom then n is a leaf of K, 
3. if L(n) is not an axiom then the sons of n in K are created and labeled according 
to the rules of the system 9’. 
The definition of a quasi-model of y is defined in a similar to that of a tableau, except 
that the system Ym~ is used instead of 9’ and we impose the additional requirement 
that no leaf is labeled by a tableau axiom. 
The definition of a quasi-refutation of y is similar to that of tableau, except that the 
system 9’,f is used instead of 9’ and we impose the additional requirement that every 
leaf is labeled by a tableau axiom. 
Remarks 3.4. Each quasi-model, as well as a quasi-remtation can be obtained from a 
tableau by cutting off some nodes. 
Definition 3.5. Given a path 9 of a tableau F = (T, L), a truce on 9 will be a 
function Fr assigning a formula to every node in some initial segment of 9’ (possibly 
to the whole S), satisfying the following conditions: 
1. If Fr(n) is defined then Fr(n) E L(n). 
2. Suppose Fr(m) is defined and let n E 9 be a son of m. 
(i) If a rule different from (ull( )) is applied in m then Fr(n) is defined, and 
(a) if the rule does not reduce the formula 97(m) then S(n) = Z+(m); 
(b) if 9?(m) is reduced by the rule applied in m then 97(n) is one of the 
results of the reduction (nondeterministically). 
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(ii) Suppose the rule (aZ/( )) is applied in m, and the label of n is CI, {p: [a] 
B E L(m)] & , where (CZ)M E L(m). Then, 
(a) if 97(m) = [a]/3 then Y?(n) is defined and equals /l; 
(b) if S-(m) = (a)~ then 5(n) is defined and equals a; 
(c) otherwise, R-(n) is undefined. (Note that, in this last case, S(m) is the 
last element of the trace.) 
Definition 3.6. A constant U regenerates on the trace Fr if for some i, ai = U and 
Cli+i = a(U), where (U = &k(X)) E 9 
The trace 97 is called v-truce iff it is infinite and some v-constant is the oldest 
constant which regenerates infinitely often. The trace is called p-trace iff some ,u- 
constant is the oldest constant which regenerates infinitely often on it. 
Remarks 3.7. Observe that any infinite trace in a tableau for a guarded formula is 
either v or @-ace. This is because every rule except regeneration decreases the size of 
the formula and every formula is eventually reduced. This second fact is true because 
on any trace there cannot be two regenerations of the same definition constant without 
application of (mod) rule in between. Note that this last property does not hold for 
unguarded formulas. 
Definition 3.8. A quasi-model 9~7 is called pre-model iff any infinite trace on any 
path of 9~& is a v-trace. 
A quasi-refutation of y is called a refutation of y iff, on every infinite path of it, 
there exists a p-trace. 
We will show in the next sections that a formula is satisfiable iff it has a pre-model, 
and that it is unsatisfiable iff it has a refutation. The condition laid on pre-models is 
due to an observation that if, for some structure .k and a state s, 4,s b ,uX.cr(X) 
then the smallest ordinal r s.t. M,s b CI’ (j-f) must be a successor ordinal. Hence 
AYS k 4@ (83) f or some Q < z. That is, in the process of investigating “the reasons” 
why a p-formula is satisfied, we have managed to reduce the index of the formula. 
Since the ordinals are well ordered, it means that we will need to regenerate particular 
instance of the ~-formula only finitely many times. The condition on refutations is dual 
and obtained from analysis of a game we are going to describe in the next section. 
4. Games 
In this section we show that any formula y has either a pre-model or a refutation. 
Let F be a tableau for y. We define an infinite game 9(F) for two players, to be 
played on F. Intuitively, player I will try to show that y is satisfiable and player II 
that it is not. Our two players play the game as follows: 
l game starts in the root of F, 
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l in any (or) node, i.e. node where (or) rule was applied player I chooses one of the 
sons, 
a in any (all( ) ) node, player II chooses one of the sons, 
l in other nodes which are not leaves, automatically the only son is chosen. 
The result of such a game is either a finite or an infinite path of the tableau F. A 
path can be finite only when it ends in a leaf which can be labeled either by an axiom 
or by an unreducible sequent but not an axiom. In the former case player II wins and 
in the latter case player I is the winner. If the resulting path is infinite, then player II 
wins iff there exists a p-trace on the path. 
Our interest in such a game is justified by the following. 
Proposition 4.1. There is a strategy for the first player in the game S’(F) ifs there 
is a pre-model for y contained in J r. There is a strategy for the second player in the 
game S(F) ifs there is a refutation for y contained in F-. 
Proof. If there is a pre-model of y contained in F then the strategy for player I is to 
stay in the nodes belonging to this pre-model. Conversely, a strategy for the first player 
induces a pre-model as follows. The root of F is of course included in a pre-model. 
If a node is included in a pre-model and this is a position where player I has to play, 
we select the son designated by the strategy. If player II is to play, we select all the 
sons. An argument for the case of refutations is similar. 0 
Clearly, at most one of the players may have a winning strategy in the game 3(F). 
Therefore, a formula cannot have a pre-model and a refutation at the same time. 
However, it is not obvious that it must have one of them. Indeed, an infinite games 
may be undetermined, i.e. with no strategy existing for either player [ 111. 
In what follows, we show that the game B(F) is nevertheless determined, viz there 
is always a winning strategy for one of the players. This fact can be deduced from 
general theory of infinite games of Gale and Stewart as considered, e.g. in [lo, 111. 
We briefly recall the definition of these games. 
A game G(Y,A) is defined by an arena Y and a winning set A, say, for the first 
player. Here Y LX* is a set of strings over some set X which is closed under initial 
segments, and such that any string in Y has a prolongation in Y. Let F(Y) CX” be 
the set of infinite sequences which have all finite prefixes in the arena Y. The winning 
condition A is a subset of F(Y). 
The players I and II pick alternatively elements in X constructing by this an infinite 
sequence from F(Y), x1,x2,. . . At infinity, the player I wins if the selected sequence 
is in A, otherwise II is the winner. The set F(Y) can be equipped with the Cantor 
topology, that is a topology induced by the metric d(u,u) = 2-” whenever u # v and 
n is the least position such that u(n) # v(n). Martin [lo] proved that if A is a Bore1 
set then the game is determined. 
It remains to choose X, Y and A in such a way that our game could be presented as 
a Gale and Stewart game with a Bore1 winning condition. We chose X to be the set 
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of all sequents that can appear in a tableau for y plus some dummy symbol. Then the 
arena Y will be obtained from the tableau y by extending paths ending with a leaf 
by repetitions of the dummy symbol. The winning set A C F(Y) will be of course the 
set of paths that neither contain a p-trace nor pass thorough an axiom sequent. Notice 
that the natural definition of this set involves an existential second-order quantifier. 
In order to show that A is indeed Borel, we first observe that the set of all infinite 
sequences over X that do not contain infinite traces and do not pass through axiom 
sequents, is an o-regular language, and hence it is Ci in the Bore1 hierarchy over X0 
(c.f., e.g. [18]). Now A can be obtained by intersecting this set with 9(Y), and the 
last is a closed set since it is the set of all infinite paths of a tree. Thus A is a Bore1 
subset of Xw with the Cantor topology. In order to see that it is Bore1 also in 9(Y), 
observe that every set Z G F(Y) which is closed in X0 is also closed in 9(Y). 
Thus, from Martin’s theorem and Proposition 4.1 we deduce the following. 
Proposition 4.2. Let y be arbitrary formula and F a tableau of y. Then there exists 
a pre-model of y in 5 or a refutation of y in F. 
5. Characterization 
In this section we prove that y is satisfiable iff there exists a pre-model for it. From 
the results of the previous section, it will follow that y is not satisfiable (viz my is 
valid) iff there exists a refutation for ly. Similar results concerning pre-model were 
proved in [17,15]. 
It will be convenient to use a characterization of the extremal fixpoints in terms of 
possibly transfinite induction. We introduce two new constructs p’Xa(X) and v’Xa(X), 
where z is any ordinal, with the following semantics: 
(a) II p”X.GU llVal = 0, II vOx.HX) II V@l = s, 
(b) II aT+=(X) llval = II a(x) Ilvar~,,a~x.a~x~,,,,,xl (a stands for P or v), 
(c) ll @X.cr(X) llval = U,, <z 1) pL”‘X.a(X) 11 va,, for z limit ordinal, 
(d) ]I vTX.a(X) ]I vnl = n,, <T )I /X.a(X) ]I val, for z limit ordinal. 
Then we have 
II &wm IIVd = IJ II PZJwW IlVd II vx.G) IIVd = n II vTJwJ3 IIVd 
T T 
We extend the notion of definition list from Section 3, by allowing equations of the 
form (U = a’X.a(X)). The concept of expansion Qaj extends immediately. 
Now we introduce the notion of the signature similar to that considered by Streett 
and Emerson [17]. 
Definition 5.1. Fix a formula j? without free variables, a definition list 9 containing all 
definition constants occurring in j?, and a state s of a model A! such that A,s + @lg. 
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Let ~kl~~kz~~~~~ Ukdr be all ~-constants occurring in 9. We define a signature of p 
in s, Sig&?,s), as the least (in the lexicographical ordering) sequence of ordinals 
(Zl,..., Tdr) such that A,s + {/?j~/, where 9’ is a definition list constructed from 
9 by EphCing the ith definition Of a ~-constant (u, = flak,(X)) E 9 by ( ukl = 
p’Xa,(X)) for each i = 1,. . . ,dp. 
We first show that signatures behave well with respect o formula reduction. 
Lemma 5.2. For any state s of a model A, dejnition list 23 and formulas CC,& 
,uX..cr(X),vX.cr(X) such that every deJinition constant occurring in them occurs also in 
9: 
- Zf A’,s k Qa A /?jg then Sig9(a A /?,s) = max(Sig&a,s),Sig&?,s)). 
- rf 4,s k 4~ V jljg then Sig&a V /?,s) = Sig,(a,s) or Sig,(a V /3,s) = Sig,(p,s). 
- Zf A,s t= Q(a)aj9 then Sig&(a)cr,s) = Sig&cr,t) for some t such that (s,t) E 
RA(a). 
- If A?,s k ([alaJo then Sig&[a]cr,s) = sup{Sig&cr, t) : (s, t) E R”(a)}. 
- Zf A?,s + QvX.lx(X)~ 9 and (V = vX.cr(X)) E 9 then Sig&vX..a(X),s) = Sig,( V,s). 
- rf d,s I= QG..a(X)D 9 and (Vi = @Lx(X)) E 9 is the ith of the u-constants in 9 
then the prefixes of length i - 1 of Sig9(pX.cr(X),s) and Sig,( Ui,s) are equal. 
- ZfA,s k QWD 3 and ( W = aX..a(X)) E 9 then Sig,( W,s) is equal to Sig&a( W), s) 
tf W is a v constant. Zf W is the ith u-constant in 9 then the latter signature is 
smaller and the difference is at the position i or less (in fact the dtrerence is 
exactly at the position i but a weaker statement is enough for our purposes), 
Proof. We will consider only the last case. SuppOSe 4,s k [&,I& where u, is 
the ith definition constant from 9. Let (u, = flclk,(X)) E $8, remember that only 
definition constant older than u, can appear in @g(X). Let Sig,( U,, , s) = (71,. . . , z, ) 
and 9’ be a definition list obtained from 9 by replacing the jth ~-constant definition 
(uk, = @.a,(X)) E 9 by (uk, = p’JX@k,(X)) for every j = 1,. . . ,n. Let us denote 
QIQ(X)D~, by B(X). F rom the definition of the signature, we have 4,s + P~X$(X). 
Observe that ri must be a successor ordinal hence A?,s + /?(fiG-‘X./?(X)) which 
implies the thesis of the lemma. q 
Proposition 5.3. Zf a positive guarded sentence y is satisjiable then any tableau for 
y contains a pre-model for y as its subtree. 
Proof. The proof is based on a Streett and Emerson’s proof [17], a similar idea was 
also used in [16]. We present his proof in order to show the duality with the proof 
of the converse proposition. 
Let us take a sentence y and a model .M = (SA,RA,pA) in which y is satisfiable. 
Let 9 = Dya = (UI = ~l),...,(Ud = Yd) and let 
(uk, = @.ak,(X)),...,(Ukdp = flak,,(x)) 
be the subsequence of all p-definitions in 9. 
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Given a tableau F for y, we will construct a pre-model Y&Z = (K,L) as a subtree of 
9. Starting from the root of F, we will subsequently select the nodes of F that will 
be included in PJ#. With every node n of PJ%? under construction, we will associate 
a state s, of &Y such that &Z,s, + &C(n)]. 
The root of F becomes the root of .9’JZ and, for the associated state, we choose 
any state of k in which the formula y is satisfied. 
Suppose that we have already selected a node n of 94 with an associated state s,. 
We will show how to proceed from this point depending on what rule was used in the 
node n of F: 
1. If the (or) rule was applied to L(n) = CI V /I, r kg then select the son of II with 
formula a if Sig&a,s,) <Sig&a V B,s,) and the son with /? otherwise. Associate 
the state s,, with the chosen node. 
2. If the (a/l( )) ru e 1 was applied then select all sons of n. For any son n’ of n, there 
is a formula of the form (a)~ the reduction of which resulted in the label of n’. For 
the node n’, choose a state t such that (s,, t) E R(a) and Siga( (a)a,s,) >Sig,(cc, t). 
(Such a state exists, by Lemma 5.2.) 
3. If n has no sons then it must be labeled by an unreducible sequent which is not an 
axiom. This is because [L(n)] is satisfied in the state s,, hence a formula and its 
negation cannot simultaneously appear in L(n). 
4. For all other rules, just take the only son of n in F as the next node of 9.M and 
associate the state S,I = s,, with it. 
We will show that 9k’ constructed in this way is indeed a pre-model for y. 
As we mentioned above, every leaf of P’Jli! is labeled by an unreducible sequent 
which is not an axiom. Hence 94 is a quasi-model and it only remains to show 
that any infinite trace Fr = {IX~}~~P on any path P is a v-trace. Suppose to 
the contrary that we can find a trace Fr such that the oldest constant re- 
generated infinitely often on it is some ith ,kconstant uk,. Clearly, after some 
point no, u, must be the oldest constant which will be regenerated on the 
trace. 
Observe that Lemma 5.2 implies that, from the point no, the prefix of length i of the 
signatures of formulas in Fr never increases. Indeed, the only way the prefix could 
increase without regeneration of a definition constant older than ukz is an application 
of the rule (CL) with a constant older than I&, . But then the next reduction on the trace 
would be a regeneration of the constant older than uk{. 
Lemma 5.2 also says that the prefix actually decreases after each regeneration of 
uk,. Since we have assumed that u, is regenerated infinitely often, we obtain a con- 
tradiction, because the lexicographical ordering on sequences of bounded length over a 
well ordering is also a well ordering. This shows that every trace of P.&Y is a v-trace, 
hence 9&! is a pre-model. q 
Now we will show implication in the other direction, i.e. we show, given a pre-model 
for y, how to construct a structure where y is satisfied. 
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Definition 5.4. Given a pre-model PA = (K,L), the canonical structure for B&Z is 
a structure A? = (SA,R-//,pA) such that: 
1. SA is the set of all nodes of 94 which are either leaves or to which (all( )) rule 
was applied. For any node n of 9’A we will denote by des, the closest descendant 
of n, or n itself, belonging to SM. (Note that des, is well defined. Indeed, since 
the formulas in consideration are guarded, each infinite path in the pre-model must 
contain infinitely many nodes where the (all{ ) ) rule is applied and there are no 
other branching points in the tree.) 
2. (s,s’) E RA(a) iff there is a son n of s with des, = s’, such that L(n) was obtained 
from L(s) by reducing a formula of the form (a)~ 
3. p”Q) = {s: p occurs in the sequent L(s)}. 
Proposition 5.5. If there exists a pre-model 9&Z for a positive guarded sentence y 
then y is satisjable in the canonical structure for .9’A. 
Proof. Let 8&Y = (K,L) be a pre-model of a sentence y. Let A? = (S”,RA,pA) 
be the canonical structure for $‘,A. Let 54 = 070 be a definition list and let (Vi = 
vX$i(X)), . . . , ( Vdv = vX&p(X)) be a sublist of v-definitions from 9. 
Suppose that ~Z,des,, k y, where no is the root of PA. From now on we will 
proceed in a way similar to the proof of Proposition 5.3. 
First we define the notion of a v-signature, Sig&(a,s), which is defined for a formula 
c1 and state s such that A?,s k CC 
Sig&(a,s) = Sig,&lcc,s) 
Definition list 19 is obtained from the definition list 9 by replacing each definition 
(U = a&x(X) with (U = -~%..or(X)). (Recall that we have allowed negation to occur 
only before propositional constants, but the negation of an arbitrary formula can be 
defined by the De Morgan laws and other dualities of the fc-calculus.) Observe that 
Lemma 5.2 translates to v-signatures after interchanging p with v, ( ) with [ ] and 
conjunction with disjunction. 
Next we show that the assumption ~‘!,des,, p y implies that we can construct 
a p-trace on some path P of BA, which contradicts the hypothesis that 94 is a 
pre-model of y. 
We will simultaneously construct a path P and a trace Fr = {LX~}~~P. The first 
element will be of course a,, = y. Now suppose that we have constructed fi up to 
an element a, E L(m), such that .k’,des, p {a,,,]. We select the next element a,,,! as 
follows: 
(i) if a rule different from (all{ )) was applied to L(m) then there is only one son 
m’ of m and 
(a) if a, was not reduced by this rule then a,,,! = am, 
(b) if a,,, = cp A $ was reduced then choose a,,,! = cp if Sig&(cp A $, des,) B 
Sig&(q, des,), else choose a,! = +, 
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(c) if CI, = cp V t+b then choose a,,, I to be the formula which occurs in L(m’), 
(d) in other subcases just take the resulting formula as the next element of the 
trace. 
(ii) if (all{ )) rule was applied then: 
(a) if a, = (a)q then there is a son m’ of m the label of which was obtained by 
reducing this formula. Take CQ = cp 
(b) if a, = [a]cp then, because des, p a,, there exists a state t such that 
(des,, t) E R”(a) and Sig&(cp,t)<Sig&([u]cp,s). Observe that, from the def- 
inition of our structure, this means that there is some son m’ of m, such that 
q E L(m’) and des,, = t. So let us take N,,,I = q. 
If the constructed trace were finite then from the definition of the canonical structure 
and the restrictions on the application of the rule (a/Z{ )) it follows that either the last 
element of the trace, IX,,,, is a propositional constant p or its negation, or m is a leaf of 
@‘A’ and M, is a formula of the form [a]$. Then, from the definition of the canonical 
structure, we have that .M,des, b a,, a contradiction. 
Using an argument about signatures similar to the one in Proposition 5.3, we can 
show that the oldest constant regenerated infinitely often on R must be a p-constant. 
But 8A is a pre-model hence all its traces are v-traces, a contradiction. 0 
It should be clear that Propositions 5.3 and 5.5 hold not only for positive guarded 
sentences but for all positive guarded formulas. Putting them together we obtain: 
Theorem 5.6. There exists a pre-model of a positive guarded formula y ljj- y is 
sutis$uble. 
Finally, using our results from previous section we obtain also a characterization of 
valid formulas. 
Theorem 5.7. A positive guarded formula +y is valid ifl there exists a refutation 
for Y. 
Proof. Consider any tableau r for y. Since there is no model for y, we cannot find a 
pre-model in Y hence from Proposition 4.2 there is a refutation in 9. 
In other direction, if 9 is a refutation for y then we know that in the tableau F, 
of which 9 is a subtree, we cannot find a pre-model. Hence from Proposition 5.3 it 
follows that y is not satisfiable and ly is valid. 0 
6. Complexity 
In this section we give bounds on the size of a refutation of a formula and consider 
the computational complexity of the problem for finding a refutation. 
Emerson and Jutla [4] gave the exact bound of the decidability problem for the 
p-calculus, by showing that the satisfiability problem for the p-calculus is decidable in 
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deterministic exponential time. The completeness of the problem for this complexity 
class follows from the lower bound for PDL due to Fischer and Ladner[6]. Streett and 
Emerson [17] also show a small model theorem for the propositional ~-calculus which, 
combined with the later results of Emerson and Jutla [4], tells that if a sentence has a 
model then it has a finite model of the size exponential in the size of the sentence. 
Considering the proof method used in [4], we can restate this result as follows. 
Theorem 6.1 (Emerson and Jutla). There is an algorithm which decides zfa p-calculus 
sentence y is satisfiable in time exp( Iv]). Zf this is the case, the algorithm constructs 
a model of the size exp( 1 y 1) in time exp( Iv]). 
The key fact needed for this theorem is a result on complexity of Rabin tree automata 
that is also shown in [4]. 
Theorem 6.2 (Emerson and Jutla). There is an algorithm which, given a Rabin au- 
tomaton with n states and m pairs, decides in time O(n”‘) whether the automaton 
accepts some tree. Zf it is the case, the algorithm constructs in time O(n”‘) a regular 
tree of the size O(n) accepted by the automaton. 
This last result can be also used for obtaining the upper bound for the size and the 
time of construction of refutations. 
Let a p-calculus sentence y be given. Let C be the alphabet consisting of all the 
sequents that can appear in a tableau of y. Observe that ]Z;1 = exp(]y(). Since the rules 
of the system S are nondeterministic, there may be many tableaux of y. Clearly, we can 
construct a tableau Y of y, which is a regular tree of size exp( ]y I), and the construction 
can be performed in time exp( IyI ). We construct a Biichi automaton on infinite words 
over C which nondeterministically chooses a trace from a path in Y and accepts iff 
this is a p-trace. It is easy to see that 0( Iyl) states are sufhcient for this job. Applying 
the Safra deterministic construction [14], we get a Rabin automaton on o-words with 
exp(lyl) states and WI) P airs. Finally, following the construction of exp( Iy]) states 
and 0( I y 1) pairs, which accepts precisely the refutations of y. This automaton is actually 
obtained as a product of the above Rabin automaton on o-words and an automaton 
checking local consistency, i.e. that a tree is a quasi-refutation contained in Y. We 
can therefore state the following. 
Theorem 6.3. There is an algorithm which, given a p-calculus sentence y, constructs 
a model of size exp( I y 1) or a refutation of size exp(l y]). The algorithm runs in time 
exp(lyl). 
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Appendix A. An Example 
In this appendix, we would like to show an example of the use of refutations. 
Suppose that we are given two specifications of modules. The first one, 
Fi = /z.[aJx v (vY.[a]Y A C), 
requires that on any execution of the program, from some point a condition C must 
be satisfied. The second one says that there should always be an execution such that 
from every point it can reach a state where C is unsatisfied: 
F2 = vX((a)X A (pY.(a)Y v -C) 
We would like to find out why this two requirements are contradictory, or, in other 
words, why the conjunction of the two formulas is unsatisfiable. 
First we name all fixpoint subformulas of F1 A F2 and obtain a definition list 9: 
u, = /LX.[a~ v (vY.[u]Y A C) 
V, = vY.[u]Y A c 
V2 = vX(u)X A (pY.(u)Y v -C) 
u, = pY.(u)Y v 4J 
Below we present a refutation of FI A F2; some simplifications were used for nota- 
tional convenience. 
Fi,Fz t9 
LalU, v2 b Vl, v2 t9 
[al&, (4v2, (4U2 v + t-3 
In this part of the refutation two nodes in frames are the same as the node just 
below the root, hence we have two cycles here. The part of the tableau starting from 
the node labeled VI, V2 t9 will be presented below. 
From first part of the refutation, we can read. that there is a @race with regenerations 
of U, on both cycles. This shows that in any potential model of F1 A F2, we must 
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have a state which satisfies (Vi, V, t-s 1. The rest of the tableau for FI A FZ shows 
that there is no way to satisfy [Vi, V2 E9 1. 
vt, v2 & 
[a]& A c, (u)U2 v -c t, 
In this part of the refutation we have one cycle, marked by the sequent in a frame, 
and two leaves labeled by axioms. This part of the refutation shows that in order to 
satisfy VI A V2, one must satisfy VI A UZ. But this is impossible because the marked 
cycle has a @race with a regeneration of U2. 
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